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INTRODUCTION
he Galileo system currently under definition is the European contribution to the second generation of global navigation satellite systems (GNSS 2). It has been proposed as a global, satellite-based navigation system and will support multi-modal transport navigation requirements and many other applications requiring spatial and/or temporal information, plus derivatives, to users equipped with suitable Galileo receivers. It has also been proposed that Galileo will be compatible and interoperable with GPS, GLONASS, space-based augmentation systems (SBAS), and ground-based augmentation systems (GBAS) currently under development. The system, which is expected to achieve full operational capability (FOG) by 2008, will be under European civil control and open to international participation.
Of the navigation services identified during the definition studies, it is envisaged that only a sub-set of these services will be supported entirely by the Galileo system. The others could be supported through the combined use of the Galileo system with other sensors and other systems such as GPS. From the user perspective, and considering the current systems (GPS and GLONASS), and those under development (EGNOS, WAAS, and MSAS), potential exists for enhanced navigation performance when data from other systems are combined with that from the Galileo system. For this reason, it is important to investigate the impact on the performance levels achievable and hence the potential user services that would benefit from such a combined approach.
INTEGRITY MONITORING
The required navigation performance (RNP) of a system is typically specified in terms of the four parameters of accuracy, integrity, continuity and availability (Ochieng, Shardlow, & Johnston, 1999) .
1. Accuracy is defined as the degree of conformance of an estimated or measured position at a given time, to the truth. 2. Integrity relates to the trust, which can be placed in the correctness of the information supplied by the navigation system. It includes the ability of the navigation system to provide timely warnings to users when the system must not be used for navigation/ positioning. Specifically, a navigation system is required to deliver a warning (alarm) of any malfunction (an alarm limit being exceeded) to users within a given period of time (time-to-alarm] and with a given probability (integrity risk}. 3. Continuity is defined as the ability of the total system to perform its function without interruption during an intended period of operation. Continuity risk is the probability that the system will be interrupted and not provide guidance information for the intended period of operation. This risk is a measure of system unreliability. 4. Availability is defined as the percentage of time during which the service is available for use, taking into account all outages, whatever their origins. The service is available if all the accuracy, integrity, and continuity requirements are satisfied.
Of the RNP parameters given above, integrity is the one that relates most directly to safety and is therefore a crucial element, particularly for those applications that are safety-of-life (SOL) critical such as civil aviation. The different approaches to the monitoring of integrity of stand-alone and augmented satellite-based navigation systems are:
• Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (RAIM). Ground-based integrity monitoring using an independent network of integrity monitoring stations and a dedicated Ground Integrity Channel (GIC). • Satellite Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (SAIM) based on the monitoring of the performance of the frequency generation mechanism on board the satellite.
These methods are complementary and for very strict SOL integrity requirements, more than one technique will usually be required (Fernow & Loh, 1994) .
Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring {RAIM)
Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (RAIM) is a method applied by the user (i.e., the receiver) to check the consistency of the measurements made from different satellites to estimate the quality of the resulting position. RAIM methods therefore require redundant measurements and good constellation geometry. Range measurements must be available from a minimum of five satellites, with adequate geometry, to allow an anomaly to be detected, a minimum of six satellites are required to remove the faulty satellite observations from the solution.
To carry out a RAIM capability analysis, the definition of integrity given above has to be transformed into quantifiable requirements. Performance thresholds must be specified in terms of alarm limits, integrity risk, timeto-alarm, false alarm rates, and probability of missed detection. The constellation configuration and the corresponding User Equivalent Range Error (UERE) budgets must also be known. Additionally, the coverage area and spatial and temporal sampling interval must be defined.
The Galileo constellation used for the simulations carried out during this study was the Walker model of 30 medium Earth orbit (MEO) satellites, evenly distributed in three orbital planes (Vincent, 2000) . The predicted GPS constellation for 2008-2010 was based on the current launch schedule and modernization plans. Every GPS and Galileo satellite was assigned a predicted UERE budget based on previous analysis from the Galileo definition study and official United States Department of Transport/Department of Defense (DoT/DoD) estimates (Lannelongue et al., 2000; Ochieng & Cross, 2000a , 2000b Turner, Shaw, & Sandhoo, 2000) . Appropriate mapping functions have been used to model the effects of satellite elevation on the UERE. Table 1 presents UERE values for GPS and Galileo satellites at selected elevations. The results presented in this article have been derived using the GALA estimates for GPS satellites, applying LI /L2 values to block IIR-modified satellites and L1/L5 values to block IIP satellites. The Galileo satellites were assigned the UERE budgets defined for CAS, Controlled Access Service, for professional market applications. Table 2 lists the integrity performance thresholds for Galileo used during this research (Ochieng & Cross, 2000a , 2000b . Further parameters are derived in the following section. The capability to perform RAIM depends on the thresholds specified.
RUN AND THE SVJDE ALOORITHIVf
The integrity algorithm comprises two main steps. Firstly, the minimum size of gross error, sometimes referred to as a blunder or outlier, in an observation that will be detected at a given probability is determined, any larger errors will be detected, smaller errors will not. Secondly, the impact that the smallest detectable error would have on the estimated receiver position is quantified to determine if it leads to a positioning error exceeding the alarm limit.
Computing the Marginally Detectable Error
The Marginally Detectable Error (MDEj) for an observation, i, is the minimum size of gross error that win be detected at a selected probability, and is given by (Cross, 1983) , (1) where 5f depends only on the chosen probabilities, a and p, of Type 1 (i.e., the probability of false alarm) and Type 2 (the probability of missed detection) errors respectively, and is expressed as (2) where a and b are determined using the probability of Type 1 and Type 2 errors respectively and assuming a normal distribution, and,
where <si is the variance of observation i, and G Vi is the standard deviation of the residual vi.
The variance for each observation i is the square of the UERE for satellite i, and is contained on the leading diagonal of the covariance matrix of the observations, Q. The standard deviation of the residual i, (a vi ) is the square-root of the variance, from the leading diagonal of the covariance matrix of residuals C v , which is given by (4) where Q is the covariance matrix of the observations, A is the design matrix relating the observations to the estimated parameters, and C x is the covariance matrix of the estimated parameters 
Computing the Position Shift due to Each MDE
Having determined the minimum gross error that will be detected at the specified probability from each observa- tion, the impact that this error has on the estimated position is now computed from, 
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM RAIR/1
The process of determining whether the capability to perform RAIM exists (i.e., RAIM availability) proceeds as follows:
1. Determine the MDE for each observation [Equation (1)] 2. Compute the position shift due to the MDE from each satellite in turn [Equation (5)] 3. Test the position shifts against the alarm limits. 4. If the shifts are within the alarm limits then the capability to perform RAIM exists (i.e., RAIM is available).
Determination 81 the prohahility of a tiluntiep occurring within the system
At the time this study was conducted a value for the probability of a blunder occurring had not been specified for the Galileo system. As part of this research, a value was determined by assessing the unscheduled failure modes of the GPS satellites. This value has been used both for the GPS and Galileo satellites. The process adopted for the unscheduled satellite failure mode analysis is given below.
Unscheduled simultaneous EPS satellite failure analysis
The analysis of simultaneous unscheduled satellite failures has been carried out under three main assumptions (Phlong & Elrod, 1994) .
'
All GPS satellites are identical, and operate identically and independently.
•
The constellation is in a steady state, i.e., the satellites in orbit have randomly distributed ages. • All failure probability density functions have exponential models of the form:
When RAIM is available, if an outlier that would produce a position error in excess of the alarm limit occurred in an observed range, then it would be identified by the receiver's integrity algorithm at the selected probability level.
Setting Probability Levels for the Study
The integrity requirements for the Galileo user services have been specified in terms of integrity risk, vertical and horizontal alarm limits, and time-to-alarm. In order to carry out a RAIM capability analysis, the probabilities of missed detection and false alarm must also be specified.
Integrity risk is the probability during the period of operation that an error, whatever the source, will result in a computed position error exceeding the alarm limit, and that the user will not be informed within the specified time-to-alarm.
The missed detection probability ((3) required to meet the integrity risk of 10~7/hr specified for the Galileo system can be determined if the probability of a blunder occurring within the system is known. The corresponding Reliability function is therefore given by the expression:
From the above expressions, the probability (Pf) that at time to, a satellite is working well and that during the period to + k (where k is the period of operation) a failure occurs is given by the following expression:
From expression (9) it can be seen that the probability of failure only depends on the parameter k, i.e., the period of operation. It does not depend on to (corresponding to lack of memory).
Given the number of satellites in the constellation m, and the number of unscheduled simultaneous satellite failures n, the probability that n satellites fail while the remaining m-n satellites are operational is given by: (10) The frequency of failures over a period of T years can then be obtained from (11) Using the above expressions, the probability of any number of simultaneous satellite failures can be determined. For this study the calculations have been based on the GPS satellite design value for MTBF of 2346 hours, this is equivalent to 3.73 failures per satellite per year (Conley, 1998 ). An example of the output of this process for a 54-satellite constellation, i.e., Galileo plus GPS, used for subsequent analysis is a probability of failure of one satellite estimated at 2.2 x 1CT 2 unscheduled failures per hour. Note that the instantaneous simultaneous failure of more than one satellite is highly unlikely (e.g., a probability of failure of 3 x 1CT 8 for the two-satellite case). In this case extended RAIM algorithms could be used.
The probability of missed detection. The missed detection probability (p 1 ) needed to satisfy the risk criteria given this frequency of unscheduled satellite failures is 4.5 x 1CT 6 . The b value used in Equation (2) is derived from a normal distribution using this probability figure (i.e., b-4.433).
The probability of false alarm. It is apparent from Equation (2) that to compute the test statistic Sf, a must also be derived. This is accomplished using a similar assumption of normal distribution and a probability a, which is the probability of a false alarm. The false alarm rate must be set by the user for a particular application.
The RTCA MOPS false alarm rate for GPS WAAS airborne equipment is 1 x l(T 5 /hr (RTCA, 1998). With the minimum time interval between independent samples set at 150 s, the false alarm probability is equal to 4 x 10~7; in line with previous Galileo studies this figure has been simplified to 1 x 10~6. This independent sampling interval was determined during previous projects conducted by Alcatel Space Industries and assumes that the clock, ephemeris, and ionospheric errors have been corrected. Alternative false alarm rates have been proposed for different applications, for example the RTCA MOPS figure for supplemental navigation is 0.002 alarms per hour (RTCA, 1991) . Assuming the same time interval of 150 s for independent samples, the false alarm probability per sample is 8 x 10~5. In the GPS risk assessment carried out by the John Hopkins University (Corrigan et al, 1999 ) the assumption is made that with the removal of selective availability there are only 10 independent measurements per hour, i.e., an interval of 360 s. Applying this figure to the hourly false alarm rates would clearly produce more alternative figures for false alarm probabilities.
As the values for the probability of missed detection ((3) and false alarm (a) will vary in practice, the simulation program has been run with two alternative scenarios ( Table 3 ) that reflect the range of values from the sources described. Scenario 1 assumes relatively high probabilities for missed detection (P) and false alarm (a), while scenario 2 imposes more stringent constraints.
The algorithms and input parameters have been implemented in GNSS design software developed at the London Centre for GNSS Research (LCGR).
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

RAIM Availability
The capability to perform RAIM with Galileo only and a combined Galileo/GPS constellation has been assessed using the marginally detectable errors (MDE) algorithm. If RAIM is available, then a receiver has enough information to be able to detect the presence of errors of a certain size at a certain probability. As the required probability levels will vary with the positioning application, scenarios have been tested using two alternative probability levels. The minimum probability level has been set at a relatively relaxed level, i.e., a relatively high proportion of errors will remain undetected. The maximum probability level reflects more stringent requirements, e.g., for safety of life applications, for which the probability of detecting an error must be considerably higher.
Using the two scenarios in Table 3 the proportion of time at which RAIM is available has been determined. Table 4 shows the percentage of samples, at a 5-min time interval and 5-degree ground resolution computed over 24 hours, at which the minimum size of position shift that could be detected was within the 18-m vertical and horizontal alarm limit, i.e., RAIM availability. The temporal and spatial sampling intervals are the same as those used in the GPS risk assessment carried out at the John Hopkins University (Corrigan et al, 1999) . During this study a denser sampling grid and a 1-min time interval were tested and found not to alter the results in any significant way. RAIM availability figures are given on a regional and global scale, as defined for the potential Galileo service coverage. These figures show some important points:
• The increased redundancy and improved constellation geometry in the outlier detection algorithm resulting from a combined constellation improves RAIM availability significantly. Using Galileo satellites alone, it is only possible to detect errors leading to vertical shifts greater than the 18-m alarm limit for 65% of the samples at the minimum probability level, at the maximum probability level this figure falls as low as 7%. With the combined Galileo/GPS constellation RAIM is available almost 100% of the time at the minimum probability level and 92% of the time at the maximum probability level, a significant improvement. RAIM availability levels for regional and global coverage do not differ significantly.
• RAIM availability clearly depends on the specified performance parameters, including alarm limits and probabilities of missed detection and false alarm. Horizontal performance is significantly better than vertical. If horizontal and vertical alarm limits are set to the same value, as they were when this research was undertaken, then it is only the vertical component that will dictate whether or not RAIM is available. The following section discusses the determination of suitable alarm limits. RAIM performance will also be influenced by the constellation design, the probability of system failures and the UERE budgets for each satellite. RAIM analysis is clearly dependent on these key parameters, which must be set appropriately for the navigation system and the specific application.
These summary figures give an overall indicator of RAIM performance over time and space. Figures 1 and 2 show the percentage of time that RAIM is available at the minimum probability level for each sample point over 24 hours, using a vertical alarm limit of 18 m. With 288 samples per point (every 5 minutes) one sample represents 0.35%, therefore figures have not been categorized beyond one decimal place. If RAIM is available at each 5-min sample over a 24-hr period it is likely that the availability at that point would be 100% regardless of recording rate.
The global distribution plots again emphasize that RAIM is available for a far greater proportion of the time, nearing 100%, when a combined Galileo and GPS constellation is used. These plots also show that RAIM performance varies with latitude-availability is greatest at mid-latitudes, with the poorest performance being found near the equator. There are also more localized patterns that may need to be studied in greater detail to optimize the constellation design for specific coverage areas.
RAIM performance and availability has been shown to be a function of a number of factors:
1. The number of redundant observations and improved constellation geometry in the outlier detection algorithm. 2. The probability with which an error must be detected. 3. The size of acceptable error. 4. The quality of the observations used.
Determination of Horizontal and Vertical Alarm Limits
The results presented have been determined based on the horizontal and vertical alarm limits as specified for the Galileo system in May 2000. The simulation tools developed for this study have also been used to determine realistic horizontal and vertical alarm limits given set probability levels. In practice, alarm limits need to be specified for a particular positioning/navigation application and should not be dictated by the capabilities of one particular navigation system; nevertheless, these figures provide some useful guides to attainable performance.
FIGURE 3. Horizontal shifts with minimum and maximum probability ievels-Gaiileo only.
Preliminary analyses have been carried out using the two probability levels described in Table 3 , to determine the position shifts resulting from the smallest gross error that can be detected. Shifts larger than the computed value will be detected, but it is not possible to detect any smaller shifts. The results of this analysis for regional coverage, based on the scenarios in Table 3 , are shown in Figures 3-6 .
The horizontal position shift resulting from the MDE at the minimum probability level is below 20 m for 99.95% of the time using Galileo alone. Applying the maximum probability levels this figure falls to 92%. Depending on the specified probability levels for missed detection and false alarm, a realistic horizontal alarm limit for the Galileo constellation would be between 25 and 30 m. This would allow RAIM availability approaching 100%.
The horizontal position shift resulting from the MDE is below 10 m for 99.95% of the time at the minimum probability level, using a Galileo/GPS constellation. Applying the maximum probability levels this figure is 96.88%.
For the same probability level, smaller horizontal shifts can be detected more of the time using a combined Galileo/GPS constellation. Using this constellation the horizontal alarm limit could be reduced significantly, certainly to less than 15 m, while still allowing close to 100% RAIM availability.
The vertical position shift resulting from the MDE at the minimum probability level is below 30 m 97.2% of the time using Galileo alone. Applying the maximum probability levels this figure falls to 89.0%. Depending on the specified probability levels for missed detection and false alarm, a realistic vertical alarm limit for the Galileo constellation would be between 30 and 40 m. This would allow RAIM availability approaching 100%.
FIGURE 4. Horizontal shifts with minimum end minimum probability levels-Galileo + GPS.
Assessment of a Combined Oalileo/OFi Naviiation SystemFIGURE 5. Vertical shifts with minimum and maximum probability levels-Galileo only.
With the minimum probability level, the vertical shift from the MDE is below 15 m 98.4% of the time using a Galileo/GPS constellation. At the maximum probability level, the vertical shift from the MDE is below 15m only 69.8% of the time.
For the same probability level, smaller vertical shifts can be detected more of the time using a combined Galileo/GPS constellation. Using this constellation the vertical alarm limit could be reduced significantly, probably to between 20 and 25 m, while still allowing close to 100% RAIM availability.
